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Summary  
The EHR is a database record that incorporates a patient’s health care 
details from conception to death and which can be distributed over a 
number of sites or aggregated at a particular source. This article describes 
the function and concept of the EHR by relating it to other medical 
information technologies, other changes in health care delivery, and a 
holistic health information model. The article compares the progress that 
Europe, Australia, and the US have made in the journey towards EHR 
implementation and concludes by highlighting some of the costs, barriers 
and consequences associated with the transition to a comprehensive EHR 
system. 
INTRODUCTION 
As described by the Australian National Electronic Health Records Taskforce, the electronic health 
record (EHR) is “[a]n electronic longitudinal collection of personal health information usually based 
on the individual, entered or accepted by health care providers, which can be distributed over a 
number of sites or aggregated at a particular source”.1 Thus, the EHR is a database record that 
incorporates a patient’s health care details from conception to death, although even that description is 
being rapidly outdated by our ability to associate genetic histories and predictions with an 
individual’s record. 
 Appreciation of the importance of the EHR to the future of quality health care delivery has been 
partially obscured by the more visible electronic medical record (EMR). The EMR, which also 
attracts labels such as the electronic patient record (EPR) or electronic personal health record (PHR), 
is a more limited creature, defined as “[t]he record of the periodic care provided mainly by one 
institution … that [t]ypically ! will relate to the health care provided to a patient by an acute 
hospital”.2 Periodic and fragmented, the EMR will be an important “front-end” component of the 
EHR architecture because it allows providers to convert their information “silos” into electronic 
format. In contrast, the EHR is the mechanism that unifies those silos and will accelerate the 
integration of longitudinal patient information into the next generation of health information 
technologies, including Computerised Physician Order Entry (CPOE) and Clinical Decision Support 
Systems (CDSS), and generally improve the quality of point-of-care decision-making. 
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1 National Electronic Health Records Taskforce, A Health Information Network for Australia, Report to Health Ministers by 
the National Electronic Health Records Taskforce (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, Canberra, 2000) p 
21 (hereinafter Taskforce): http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/ehr_rep.pdf. 
2 NHS Information Authority, Information for Health – 2. Supporting Patient Care at [2.10]: 
http://www.nhsia.nhs.uk/text/pages/info4health/2.asp. Viewed July 2004.  
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 This article first describes the function and concept of the EHR by relating it to other information 
technologies that define the landscape of technologically mediated care, provides the EHR a broader 
context by relating it to other changes in health care delivery, and relates it to a more holistic health 
information model. Second, the article provides a brief description of the progress that major mature 
health systems have made in the journey towards EHR systems, noting differences in models and 
commenting on broader, distinguishing developmental trends. The article concludes by highlighting 
some of the costs, barriers and consequences associated with the transition to a comprehensive EHR 
system. 
CONTEXT AND CONCEPT 
Health care information technologies 
Even more so than with their EMR subset, EHR technology models are dependent on and intimately 
interconnected with other records-related health care information technologies (IT) such as picture 
archiving and communication systems (PACS) and “store and forward” technologies that allow such 
imaging or other video data to be viewed remotely. In a parallel development, the inherent 
inefficiencies of health care delivery have given rise to technologies designed to streamline health 
care transactions, for example the United States Data Interchange (EDI) system which mandates an 
interoperable, standardised system for processing all data exchanges between health care entities.3
 More importantly, EHR is the core technology promoted by the patient-safety movement. The 
publication of major national studies of medical error rates in the United States and Australia4 has led 
to broad calls for amelioratory systems or process redesign of health care delivery5 leading to the 
harnessing of technology to reduce error. A consensus has formed that the rapid, massive infusion of 
technology into health care is a key component in process-based reform.6 Indeed, the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) has urged “a renewed national commitment to building an information infrastructure 
to support health care delivery, consumer health, quality measurement and improvement, public 
accountability, clinical and health services research, and clinical education”, leading to “the 
elimination of most handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade”.7
 This IT-led system reform is centred on several intersecting technologies that may be grouped as 
tracking, entry, decision-support and reporting:  
“Tracking” or identifying technologies such as barcodes and accompanying scanners positively 
identify drugs, dosages and patients.8 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) “track and trace” 
technologies may displace barcode technologies for identifying tasks and further allow positive 





“Entry” technologies are represented by computerised physician order entry (CPOE) systems that 
avoid medication errors caused by illegibility and other recording mistakes.11  
“Decision-support technologies” (CDSS)12 are evolved order entry systems that have lost their 
passivity and reference drug interaction information, EHR data, or treatment models (such as 
3 See below text at 35.  
4 Wilson RM, Runciman WB, Gibberd RW, Harrison BT, Newby L and Hamilton JD, “The Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study” (1995) 163 MJA 458. 
5 See generally Leape LL, “Preventing Medical Accidents: Is ‘Systems Analysis’ the Answer?” (2001) 27 Am JL & Med 145 at 
147; Reason J, “Human Error: Models and Management” (2000) 320 BMJ 768.  
6 Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century 
(Institute of Medicine, 30 March 2001) p 15. 
7 Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, n 6, p 166 (Recommendation 9). 
8 See generally “Bar Code Label Requirement for Human Drug Products and Biological Products”, 69 FR 9120 (26 February 
2004). 
9 See Combating Counterfeit Drugs, A Report of the Food and Drug Administration (February 2004) at 1(e): 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report02_04.html#radiofrequency (noting adoption of RFID as the standard track 
and trace technology feasible by 2007). Viewed June 2004. 
10 See eg “New Research Project for RFID in Health-Care Industry”, InformationWeek, 4 May 2004: 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19502134 (discussing research project focusing on the 
use of RFID for tracking pharmaceutical products through the supply chain). Viewed June 2004. 
11 See generally “Cal Health Care Found, E-Prescribing” (2001): http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/EPrescribing.pdf. 
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clinical practice guidelines), and which offer considerable advantages over simple CPOE 
systems.13 Related are interactive devices such as appliances used for telecare14 that collect and 
monitor data from remotely located patients and trigger further evaluation and treatment.  
" 
                                                                                                                                                                   
“Reporting” systems provide for adverse event and medical error disclosure and reporting15 and 
facilitate outcomes research.16  
 Finally, an array of privacy and security-enabling technologies has developed in step with the 
increasing computerisation of health care delivery. These include physical security systems, 
authentication technologies including biometrics, and various data integrity technologies such as 
firewalls and off-site storage services that protect against or minimise the effects of virus or hacker 
attacks. 
 Mature EHR implementations will leverage these various technologies. Crucially, EHR systems 
also will provide much-needed cohesion by, for example, providing patient-related data for input into 
decision-support systems, triggering individual error-reporting and feeding outcomes into population-
based data systems. 
Changes in delivery driving EHR implementation 
The idealist might conclude that the world’s health care delivery systems’ commitment to technology 
has been driven by a shift in health care policy designed to improve and increase patient access to 
services.17 Of course, many of the emerging technologies, such as Internet access to personal and 
educational health data provided by traditional and non-traditional “providers” and the adoption of 
home telecare appliances, will have that effect.18 Particularly in the United States, however, the 
adoption of IT has been driven by business concerns, including the imperatives of reducing 
transaction costs and minimising expensive medical errors. 
 In seeking to explain the emergence of EHR systems in the United States, Tang and Hammond 
place particular emphasis on the formative role of managed care,19 whereby fee-for-service plans have 
been replaced by lower-cost plans that emphasise wellness and preventive care and coordinate care 
through primary care physicians. In this managed care environment, the “gate-keeping” primary care 
physician requires access to both clinical and administrative data and decisional tools such as clinical 
pathways. Further, the cost structure of managed care has led to horizontal and vertical consolidation 
of providers into what are known as integrated delivery systems. The successful leveraging of these 
complex integrated systems is heavily dependent on information technologies. The (typically 
employer) payers for such systems have demanded performance “report cards”, while system 
administrators use ever increasingly sophisticated utilisation review. Increasingly, these data are 
 
12 See generally Kaushal R and Bates DW, “Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) with Clinical Decision Support 
Systems (CDSSs)” in Making Health Care Safer: A Critical Analysis of Patient Safety Practices, Prepared for Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, Evidence Report/Technology Assessment, No 43, July 2001, Ch 6: 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
13 See eg Bobb A, Gleason K, Husch M, Feinglass J, Yarnold PR and Noskin GA, “The Epidemiology of Prescribing Errors: 
The Potential Impact of Computerized Prescriber Order Entry” (2004) 164 Arch Intern Med 785 (noting the desirability of 
matching CPOE systems to decision support and pharmacy systems to reduce medication errors). See Fernando B,  
Savelyich BSP, Avery AJ, Sheikh A, Bainbridge M, Horsfield P et al, “Prescribing Safety Features of General Practice 
Computer Systems: Evaluation Using Simulated Test Cases” (2004) 328 BMJ 1171. 
14 See generally Celler BG, Lovell NH and Chan DKY, “The Potential Impact of Home Telecare on Clinical Practice” (1999) 
171 MJA 518: http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/171_10_151199/celler/celler.html. Viewed June 2004. 
15 See eg Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, Open Disclosure: A National Standard for Open 
Communication in Public and Private Hospitals Following an Adverse Event in Health Care (July 2003): 
http://www.safetyandquality.org/articles/publications/OpenDisclosure_web.pdf. 
16 See generally Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Outcomes & Effectiveness: 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/outcomix.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
17 See generally Terry NP, “A Medical Ghost in the E-Health Machine” (2004) 14 (1) Health Matrix 225.  
18 See generally Celler, Lovell and Chan, n 14. 
19 Tang PC and Hammond WE, “A Progress Report on Computer-based Patient Records in the United States” in Detmer DE, 
Steen EB and Dick RS (eds), The Computer-based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for Health Care (rev ed, IOM, 
USA 1997) pp 2-3. 
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provided to patients and regulators.20 Such error and near-miss reporting systems are dependent upon 
data that are difficult to generate without sophisticated coding and nearly impossible to analyse 
without complex, comprehensive database systems. 
 Other aspects of changes in the business and concept of health care delivery also have had a 
detectible impact on the health care technology growth and the necessity for EHR data. For example, 
Tang and Hammond further identify the impact of another cost-controlling mechanism – the shift 
from inpatient to ambulatory care and how that shift places novel demands on patient data flow 
between geographically distinct providers.21
 Of growing importance worldwide are other discernible changes in healthcare delivery and health 
priorities that similarly reinforce the necessity for comprehensive and easily accessible patient data. 
First, even without the distortions caused by the structural needs of managed care, it is clear that 
health policy has embraced the concept of “shared care”. This phrase is used to denote two changes in 
the practical realities of the provider-patient relationship: first, patients should share responsibility 
with their provider for care; and second, patients are now likely to have relationships with multiple 
providers. For these restructured relationships to result in improved outcomes, patients must have 
access to health data generally and, more controversially, information in their record, while in 
multiple-provider scenarios there must be data transparency between the various providers involved 
in treatment or prescribing. 
 Data needs also are central to the increasing emphasis of health care delivery systems on 
population-based health with its emphasis on prevention and early treatment of illness. Population-
based health care, in common with other emerging health care reforms, is increasingly data-driven 
and particularly reliant on outcomes assessment.22 Western systems also are increasingly adopting 
disease surveillance programs integrated into their national bio-defence programs.23
The health information domain 
A final context that needs to be provided for the development of EHR models is a more holistic 
model that the author has described elsewhere as the “health information domain”.24 Clearly, 
technology alters the way patient health data are acquired, stored, aggregated, processed, accessed 
and distributed. In the health information domain these processes illuminate inherent tensions 
between the key stakeholders and their needs:  







regulators with health quality agendas;  
health care institutions’ access for quality assurance and marketing; and  
patient interests in confidentiality, privacy and anonymity.  
Because of these tensions and the overall complexity of the health information domain, it is helpful to 
parse it by reference to some of its more important properties – properties that extend beyond the 
traditional, such as the confidentiality inherent in the physician-patient relationship, and into the 
modern realm of data protection, health quality and population-based health care. 
 Data are (or should be) protected courtesy of properties that feature substantive and process 
controls. The former are best described by the properties of: 
“confidentiality” (that controls disclosure);  
“privacy” (that controls collection); and  
20 See generally Landro L, “The Informed Patient: Consumers Need Health-Care Data”, Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2004, 
p D3, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56918499. 
21 Tang and Hammond, n 19, p 2. 
22 See eg United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF): http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstmeth.htm. Viewed June 
2004. 
23 See eg Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness: 
http://www.cdc.gov/programs/bio.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
24 The “health information domain” and its properties are more fully described in Terry NP, “Privacy and the Health 
Information Domain: Properties, Models and Unintended Results” (2003) 10 Eur J Health L 223. For a similar model see 
HealthConnect Business Architecture Version 1.0, April 2003, pp 30-31 (hereinafter Business Architecture): 
http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/bav1.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
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Process controls are described by the properties of  
“security” (in essence, a confidentiality correlate that restricts access to data to those to whom 
they may be disclosed); and  
“integrity” (that features basic “checksum” validation and also protects against unauthorised 
modification). 
 The “access” property describes the various recognised claims to view and, in some cases, 
modify patient information. Justice and public health systems make the most persistent claims. 
However, most mature health information domains also recognise patients’ rights of access and 
correction of their own data. Outcomes assessment and error-reporting mandates will substantially 
increase demands for access to individual and population-based health records from accreditation 
bodies and government regulators. 
 Three further properties of the health information domain require highlighting in the context of 
emerging EHR models: “unity,” “quality” and “accountability.” Information domains lose their value 
proposition when they are incomplete or their data are otherwise flawed. “Unity” refers to health 
information that is “longitudinal”, consisting of records from various providers that are interlinked to 
provide a comprehensive view of a patient’s health care encounters. A longitudinal approach provides 
the data necessary for technological models (such as CDSS systems) that analyse diagnoses and 
treatments and supports shared care from multiple providers. The “security” and “integrity” properties 
of the domain are fundamental to effective implementation of EHR models. As important, however, is 
“quality”: the data must be current or timely and subject to quality auditing from extrinsic sources 
such as clinical practice guidelines. Finally, the “accountability” property denotes not only 
substantive responsibility by providers for the accuracy of the data they enter but also procedural 
identification of providers responsible for specific data.  
EHR PROGRESS IN MATURE HEALTH SYSTEMS 
The EHR will be the “central nervous system” of the health care system.25 According to the IOM, its 
core functions will be: 
1. longitudinal collection of electronic health information for and about persons; 
2. electronic access to person- and population-level information by authorised users; 
3. provision of knowledge and decision-support systems; and 
4. support for efficient processes for health care delivery.26 
Eventually, it will be against such a functional model that the progress of health care delivery systems 
towards EHR implementation must be measured. The limited progress of mature health care systems 
renders moot any current evaluation, although Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
have all made recent significant progress and demonstrated a high level of commitment to the EHR 
ideal.  
Europe 
Van Bemmel et al report that “[c]omputer-based information systems are now abundant in a large 
percentage of European hospitals as well as in primary care settings”.27 They state that, by 1996, 50% 
of Dutch primary care physicians (general practitioners) had CPR systems, and suggest a similar 
number for the United Kingdom.28 These systems (a few pilot studies aside), however, seem to be 
EMR information silos rather than true EHR systems because, as the same authors note, “[t]he data in 
CPRs are not begging to be used for electronic data exchange, research and shared care”.29
25 Ellwood PM, “Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience” (1988) 318 NEJM 1549 at 1550.  
26 Institute of Medicine, Patient Safety: Achieving a New Standard for Care, Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record 
System (Nov 2003) p 3, n 1. 
27 van Bemmel JH, van Ginneken AM and van der Lei J, “A Progress Report on Computer-based Patient Records in Europe” in 
Detmer, Steen and Dick, n 19, p 21.  
28 See n 27, p 23. 
29 See n 27, p 22. 
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 A quite different conclusion is likely to be applied to the United Kingdom’s radical National 
Programme for IT (NPfIT).30 The NPfIT has four goals:  





an electronic care records service;  
electronic transmission of prescriptions; and  
an IT infrastructure.31  
The United Kingdom Government has committed to an investment of !2.3 billion over three years 
and three times that in the following seven years. The NPfIT has been somewhat rocked by changes 
in its leadership and disputes with a major contractor. However, the EHR component (“NHS Care 
Records Service”) is reported to be on schedule. 
 Progress towards any longitudinal EHR that would link patient records across the European 
Union has been slow. In part, this is due to the limited legal authority that the European federal 
authorities have in the health care domain.32 One concrete plan is to introduce electronic health cards 
for European Union citizens by 2008; these would facilitate treatment for citizens notwithstanding 
where in the Union they seek treatment. Questions remain, however, as to which technologies to 
adopt (for example, optical or magnetic data storage on the cards) and whether the data stored on or 
authenticated by the cards would be solely transactional or whether they would reference longitudinal 
patient health information.33  
 The European Union has a robust history in EHR research, having funded the “Good European 
Health Record” (GEHR) project from 1992 to 1995.34 The GEHR has morphed into the openEHR 
Community35 and has been an influential force in the development of Australia’s HealthConnect and 
clinical messaging formats such as the Health Level 7 (HL7) standards.36 Implementation of a pan-
European health information infrastructure,37 however, remains somewhat aspirational with the 
federal authorities stating only that “Member States should develop health information networks 
between points of care (hospitals, laboratories and homes) with broadband connectivity where 
relevant”.38
30 See generally http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/InformationTechnology/NationalITProgramme/fs/en. Viewed June 
2004. See also “England Plans Major Revamp of Health Care”, Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2003, p B1, 2003 WL-WSJ 
68129874 (in 2002 United States health care computer spending increased 9.3% to US$23.6 billion); Igbokwe O, “The 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT): An Intro”, 2003 http://papers.biohealthmatics.com/papers/it_strategy/100011.aspx. 
Viewed July 2004. 
31 See http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/InformationTechnology/fs/en. Viewed July 2004. 
32 See eg Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council (Case C-376/98) (Annulling Directive 98/43/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products). 
33 Ministers welcomed the initiative on the European Health Insurance Card announced at the Barcelona Council and endorsed 
by the Seville Council as part of the eEurope 2005 Action Plan. Ministers encouraged the Commission to explore further 
initiatives in developing European Electronic Health Cards also taking into account the recent Communication from the 
Commission (COM (2003)73) on the European Health Insurance Card: Ministerial Declaration, Brussels, 22 May 2003: 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/ehealth/conference/2003/doc/min_dec_22_may_03.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
See generally e-Health, The Information Society, Setting the Targets: http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005 
/all_about/ehealth/text_en.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
34 See http://www.chime.ucl.ac.uk/work-areas/ehrs/GEHR/index.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
35 See http://www.openehr.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
36 See http://www.hl7.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
37 Ministers noted that the full exploitation of the benefits of eHealth technologies requires continued commitment to the 
development and use of a robust, secure and interoperable infrastructure, as well as to wide availability and use of broadband 
communications to maximise the efficiency of eHealth systems and applications. Commission of the European Communities, 
eEurope 2005: An Information Society for All, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
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Australia 
HealthConnect,39 Australia’s proposed national health information network,40 has the highest profile 
amongst EHR models in mature health care systems. Its development has been open, truly 
consultative, and the network has already completed two years of pilot tests. The originally distinct 
MediConnect,41 a longitudinal medication record project, has now been subsumed into the 
HealthConnect model.42 The HealthConnect architects estimate that a fully operational system will 
save A$300 million per year by, for example, reducing errors and duplication of tests.43
 The Australian EHR concept differs somewhat from the longitudinal model being developed in 
the United States. The basic HealthConnect model has been described as follows: 
[A] person’s health-related information would be collected in a standard, electronic format at the point 
of care (such as at a hospital or a GP’s clinic). This information would take the form of health 
summaries, rather than all the notes that a health care provider may choose to keep about a 
consultation. 
With the consumer’s consent, these summaries would then be able to be retrieved at any time they 
were needed and exchanged via a secure network between those particular health care providers 
authorised by the consumer to access this information.44
Thus HealthConnect is built around some features that distinguish it from other developing models. 
First, in contrast to the horizontal interoperable model being developed in the United States, it is a 
vertical or top-down system. Second, it is not a “pull” model in the sense of the centralised EHR 
system initiating a data request from an individual provider. Rather, doctors, with the consent of their 
patients, may selectively “push” data to the centralised record.45
 Third, the HealthConnect system will not be the recipient of full patient records, but only “event 
summaries”, defined as “critical information considered to be useful to other health care providers 
involved in the future care of the consumer that will be automatically extracted from tagged data in 
existing records”.46 In part following from the “summary” model but primarily from the system’s 
voluntary structure, HealthConnect does not create a true longitudinal record; rather, patients will 
choose which elements may be extracted from their existing record(s) and pushed to the 
HealthConnect record and, further, which elements of the centralised record may be used for what 
purposes or “views”.47 For example, patients might elect to include details of their psychotropic 
prescriptions in their event summaries to be viewed by all their prescribing doctors, but only consent 
to their psychiatrists’ discharge order being viewed by other mental health professionals. 
 Compared to a typically understood and comprehensive longitudinal record, HealthConnect event 
summaries could have the advantage of supplying future or parallel providers with more relevant 
 
39 See http://www.healthconnect.gov.au. Viewed June 2004. 
40 HealthConnect is a joint federal-State initiative but is primarily financed by the Federal Government and led by the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing. It had its genesis in the report of the National Electronic Health Records 
Taskforce: see n 1. 
41 See http://www.mediconnect.gov.au/. Viewed June 2004. See generally Business Architecture, n 24, pp 44-45. 
42 See HealthConnect Budget Fact Sheet, May 2004, at 3: http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/hcbfs1105.pdf. 
Viewed June 2004. 
43 Business Architecture, n 24, p 7. 
44 “HealthConnect – An Introduction”: http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/pdf_docs/fshci.pdf. Viewed June 2004. See also 
Business Architecture,  
n 24, p 19: “Event summaries (subsets of the complete information recorded by providers) are produced in standard formats for 
key health events such as home visits by a community nurse, general practice and specialist consultations and hospital inpatient 
stays. These summaries will then be forwarded to HealthConnect. Providers, given the appropriate authority, and consumers 
will be able to draw on previously forwarded events summaries and view the information through a series of structured ‘views’, 
defined to make the information meaningful to the individual provider or consumer.” 
45 HealthConnect denies that it is either a “push” or “pull” system: “Generally HealthConnect would not pull data from 
operational systems, rather that it would receive event summaries pushed from operational systems. HealthConnect would not 
generally push data to operational systems, rather that it would send the views/reports in response to a request”: Business 
Architecture, n 24, p 7. 
46 Business Architecture, n 24, p 20, para 4.3: Event summaries. 
47 Business Architecture, n 24, p 23, para 4.5: EHR views and reports. 
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patient data. The relevancy of medical data, however, tends to be a function of the receiving provider 
and the treatment he or she is to provide rather than the selectivity of the source provider or patient. 
 Autonomy (and politics) aside, the system’s laudable dedication to voluntary participation is 
perhaps somewhat justified on the basis that patients are already selective about what they tell their 
doctors and strategic in the way they change providers, and so an opt-in process harnesses these 
desires rather than fights against them. Practical considerations, however, may well defeat that article 
of faith. For example, could a truly sustainable voluntary model survive in the face of clinical 
negligence verdicts against doctors who elect not to use HealthConnect? Could successful 
comparative negligence defences be raised against patients who opted-out? Further, the proposed 
system is also intended to achieve the following “secondary” goals: 
creating a best-practice, evidence-based health system through generation of new knowledge and 









improving utilisation of health resources through implementation of better, more targeted health 
initiatives and better planning; 
improving access to services; 
improving safety of health care services through activities such as enabling rapid response to 
treatment and device failures; 
supporting research and education; and 
detecting outbreaks of disease.48 
Operationally, achieving these secondary objectives will require far more comprehensive data sets, 
albeit in some cases data that have been de-identified. 
 As with the nascent United States system discussed below, HealthConnect is addressing complex 
technical specifications that include messaging and communication, medical terminologies and 
classification schemes.49 HealthConnect is being rigorously tested and continually reassessed by its 
architects and government paymasters. It may eventually morph into a longitudinal system or, at the 
other extreme, end up being more like the controversial “Australia Card”.50
United States 
Research on purchasing trends for physician offices in the United States for 2002-2004 suggests a 
decline in amounts spent on practice management systems (US$949 million to US$856 million) and a 
parallel increase in spending on EMR systems (US$574 million to US$1,023 million).51 Estimates (in 
2003) of EMR penetration vary, with the IOM suggesting 5 to 10% of Physician Offices52 (and a 
similar penetration, 9% for CPOE systems53), but the California HealthCare Foundation found 20 to 
25%.54
 At first sight, hospitals show a slightly more robust penetration of prescribing and records 
technologies. According to the IOM, CPOE adoption is at 33%55 while 20% of hospitals have 
electronic medical records systems.56 Another estimate, however, suggests that by 2004 only 300 of 
the nation's 4,900 non-governmental hospitals had adopted the technology57 and, further, that only 40 
48 Business Architecture, n 24, p 8. 
49 Business Architecture, n 24, p 34. 
50 See generally Greenleaf G, “The Australia Card: Towards A National Surveillance System” (1987) 
http://austlii.edu.au/itlaw/articles/GGozcard.html. Viewed June 2004. 
51 EMRs for Small Physician Groups, Forrester Report (December 2003). 
52 IOM, n 26, p 3. 
53 IOM, n 26, p 3. 
54 Brailer DJ and Terasawa EL, Use and Adoption of Computer-based Patient Records (California HealthCare Foundation, 
October 2003). 
55 IOM, n 26. 
56 IOM, n 26, p 3. 
57 Freudenheim M, “Many Hospitals Resist Computerized Patient Care”, New York Times, 6 April 2004, p C1. 
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fully met the standards for such systems set by the Leapfrog Group.58 The IOM has been duly critical 
of the rate of technology adoption by United States hospitals: 
In most of the nation’s hospitals, orders for medications, laboratory tests and other services are still 
written on paper, and many hospitals lack even the capability to deliver laboratory and other results in 
an automated fashion. The situation is no different in most small practice settings, where there has been 
little, if any, migration to electronic records.59  
 Of course the United States health care system serves a very large population and is comprised of 
State, federal, private and non-profit business models that complicate implementation of an EHR. 
There are signs, however, that some of the largest private providers are increasing the pace of EHR 
adoption. For example, Kaiser Permanente, the largest non-profit HMO in the United States, with 
some 8.4 million members in nine States and 12,000 doctors, has recently adopted a three-year,  
US$1.8 billion EHR/EMR program.60
 In the public sector the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has established itself as the poster 
child for publicly funded and provided health care that is committed to process reform and 
technologically mediated delivery of services.61 However, even the VA has found itself the subject of 
intense criticism over issues such as a lack of interoperability with Department of Defense (DOD) 
systems.62
 Much of the impetus for the implementation of IT in health care delivery to reduce costs and 
errors has come from non-profit organisations whose corporate sponsors are motivated by both 
genuine altruism and a heavy dose of frustration at the continued rise in health care costs. Thus, the 
influential Leapfrog Group63 has chosen specific patient safety initiatives such as CPOE adoption and 
standards,64 evidence-based hospital referral (a program designed to match patients with high-risk 
conditions to hospitals associated with better outcomes for those conditions65), and increasing the use 
of “intensivists” to staff ICUs.66 More dominant in the EHR movement has been the “Connecting for 
Health”67 initiative funded by the Markle Foundation.68 One of the key components of that initiative 
is a “Working Group on Policies for Coordination across the EHR and the PHR”,69 which is 
concentrating on data standards70 with a view to “[a]ccelerating the rate of adoption of national 
clinical data standards in order to facilitate true interoperability”.71 Overlapping with this initiative is 
the work of the EHR Collaborative,72 which consists of the major professional stakeholders such as 
the American Medical Association and the Healthcare Information and Management Systems 
Society73 and which has coordinated responses and feedback on the HL7 data standards. 
 Although there is a general interlocking of EHR developments, the foundational initiatives are 
being promoted by the non-governmental Institute of Medicine74 and the National Committee on 
 
58 See n 57. 
59 IOM, n 26, p 3, App E. 
60 “Big HMO Plans to Put Medical Records Online”, Wall Street Journal, 4 February 2003 at D4, 2003 WL-WSJ 3958350. 
61 See eg National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS), Creating a Culture of Safety: http://www.patientsafety.gov/vision.html. 
Viewed June 2004. 
62 See generally Computer-based Patient Records: Subcommittee Questions Concerning VA and DOD Efforts to Achieve a 
Two-Way Exchange of Health Data. GAO-04-691R, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-691R. Viewed July 
2004. 
63 See generally http://www.leapfroggroup.org/FactSheets/LF_FactSheet.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
64 See http://www.leapfroggroup.org/FactSheets/CPOE_FactSheet.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
65 See http://www.leapfroggroup.org/FactSheets/EHR_FactSheet.PDF. Viewed June 2004. 
66 See http://www.leapfroggroup.org/FactSheets/ICU_FactSheet.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
67 See http://www.connectingforhealth.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
68 See http://www.markle.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
69 See http://www.connectingforhealth.org/workinggroups/pol_coordinationwg.html. Viewed June 2004. 
70 Data Standards Working Group, Report and Recommendations (5 June 2003): http://www.connectingforhealth. 
org/resources/dswg_report_6.5.03.pdf. Viewed June 2004. 
71 Data Standards Working Group, n 70 at 1. 
72 See http://www.ehrcollaborative.org. Viewed June 2004. 
73 See generally http://www.ehrcollaborative.org/index.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
74 The IOM is a member of the National Academies of Science which received its charter from the United States Congress as 
an independent advisory body: http://www.iom.edu/faq.asp?id=2959. Viewed June 2004. 
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Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS), the latter being a statutory body that advises the Federal 
Government’s Secretary of Health and Human Services.75 The work of these two bodies has 
identified the properties of the United States patient safety data model and its core EHR 
architecture.76 Unlike the United Kingdom and Australian proposals, the United States system is not 
conceived as a vertical top-down, comprehensive EHR solution; rather IOM and NCVHS are 
concentrating on creating standards for the horizontal interoperability of the diverse public and 
private records systems in the United States. While the NCVHS and IOM agree on a public-private 
partnership to achieve these goals, IOM has been somewhat more explicit in its calls for federal 
funding77 and legislative or regulatory initiatives.78
 Both IOM and NCVHS see the task ahead as involving two core components: first, building a 
national health information infrastructure;79 and second, establishing data interoperability and 
comparability for patient safety-related data.80 The second task is the more complex, technically. It 
involves creating standards for messaging, identifiers and data elements. Some of the identifier and 
messaging standards81 adopted by the United States Federal Government, pursuant to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (US),82 to create a national health care 
transactional system (an electronic data interchange or EDI system) are transferable to an EHR 
system. In the interim, these messaging formats for clinical data (as they will be used in EHRs) have 
been further developed by organisations such as HL7,83 DICOM84 and the National Council for 
Prescription Drug Programs.85
 Considerably more challenging, however, is specifying the standards required for EHRs and 
EHR data to achieve what NCVHS refers to as semantic interoperability and comparability, such that 
“the meaning of data is consistent when shared among different parties”.86 Here, both NCVHS87 and 
IOM88 have recommended the adoption of core EHR terminologies dealing with, for example, disease 
(ICD-989), medical procedures and services (CPT-490), and drug names or doses (for example, 
RxNorm91). Considerable development is also under way to standardise event taxonomy (such as 
 
75 42 USC §242k(k). 
76 National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, Report on Uniform Data Standards for Patient Medical Record 
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2003) (hereinafter PMRI Terminology Standards): http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/031105lt3.pdf Viewed June 2004.; Key 
Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, in IOM, n 26, at Executive Summary (hereinafter Executive Summary) 
and App E (hereinafter Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System): 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090776/html/. Viewed June 2004. Viewed June 2004. 
77 Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, n 76 at 3. 
78 Executive Summary, n 76 at 8 (Recommendation 3). 
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half of 2003, from 23.5 million to 28.2 million lines. For the 12-month period ending 31 December 2003, high-speed lines 
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80 See eg Uniform Data Standards, n 76 at 19. 
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ASC X12: http://www.x12.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
82 Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1988. HIPAA-EDI transactions, such as health plan enrolment, eligibility, payment and 
remittance advice, claims, health plan premium payments, health claim status, and referral certification and authorisation, are 
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developed for EHR systems. 
83 See generally Dolin RH et al, “The HL7 Clinical Document Architecture” (2001) 8 J Am Med Inform Assoc 552. 
84See http://medical.nema.org/. Viewed June 2004. 
85 See http://www.ncpdp.org. Viewed June 2004. 
86 Uniform Data Standards, n 76 at 23-24. 
87 PMRI Terminology Standards, n 76. 
88 Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, n 76. 
89 See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/otheract/icd9/abticd9.htm. Viewed June 2004. 
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adverse event or near-miss reporting)92 and to adequately capture knowledge representation (such as 
clinical practice guidelines). 
 While the HealthConnect architects apparently began with a picture of relatively limited data sets 
that patients could share, the United States architects are concentrating on the interoperability and 
comparability of all patient safety-related data,93 designing a full “pull” architecture, with little 
apparent concept of what data consumers will extract from remote systems. In large part this seems to 
be a function of the United States timeline, with the IOM not expecting comprehensive EHR systems 
to be generally online until 2008-2010.94 Currently, therefore, the United States work exists on a 
technical plain of functional models and data transparency and has not addressed the more normative 
questions surrounding who should have access to the data or who should make that decision. Of 
course, both NCVHS and the IOM are suitably sensitive to privacy and security issues and view them 
as critical components.95 Notwithstanding, the nascent United States system appears to be driven by 
maximising patient safety data flow into local (decision-support) and national (safety-reporting) 
systems96 and, at least in its present state of development, suggests patient autonomy will be 
marginalised. 
 Despite these real indications of coordinated progress in the United States, it is difficult to 
dispute Berwick’s observation that “by a rational standard, we are making dreadful progress… Many, 
many lives could be saved … a lot of injuries could be prevented if we would move faster.”97
COSTS, BARRIERS AND CONSEQUENCES 
There is considerable uncertainty as to the costs associated with e-health initiatives. During 
transitional periods costs are likely to rise as both traditional and technologically mediated models 
work in parallel. It is also likely that improved access associated with technologically mediated care 
and a concomitant increase in treatment options will increase overall demand and hence spending. 
Most immediately, the health care industry will have to adjust to the costs associated with evolving 
technologies and increasingly short system lives. Equally, there are practical, political or professional 
barriers that impede the acceptance of EHR systems. For example, there are questions about whether 
records should be converted retrospectively or whether EHR systems should be prospective, and the 
medical community is concerned at ceding autonomy to technology companies. 
 Medical records (be they paper or electronic) do not exist in a legal vacuum. Most mature 
systems have ethical, legal and regulatory codes that govern the ownership of, access to and retention 
of records. These systems have also had to address issues relating to the quality of the record, 
particularly in regard to clinical negligence claims, and what may be thought of as the “evidentiary” 
bundle of rights and duties that generally describe the interface between records and legal processes 
(including the question of spoliation). Inevitably, these legal systems will have to be modified to 
reflect an EHR world. Equally, the legal system will have to come to terms with still more 
indeterminate costs, such as the interrelationship of EHR systems with privacy and litigation systems. 
Privacy and confidentiality 
Not surprisingly the EHR systems discussed herein fundamentally change the way patient data are 
acquired, stored, aggregated, processed, accessed and distributed. The systems must, therefore, 
confront privacy, confidentiality and security constraint models. In general terms, mature legal 
systems have chosen to protect patient data with either collection-centric or disclosure-centric 
models: the former restrict what data may be collected in what circumstances and by which actors; the 
 
92 For example, by using SNOMED CT http://www.snomed.org/snomedct/index.html. Viewed June 2004. 
93 See eg “Primary and Secondary Uses” in Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, n 76 at 5. 
94 Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, n 76 at 11. 
95 See eg Key Capabilities of an Electronic Health Record System, n 76 at 4. 
96 See generally Executive Summary, n 76. Therein the IOM notes (at 3): “As a result of the paucity of EHR systems, most 
patient safety reports cannot be generated automatically as a by-product of the patient care process. Nor can the lessons learned 
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97 Dr DM Berwick, Institute for Health Care Improvement, quoted in Freudenheim , n 57, p C1. 
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latter is better described as a confidentiality system, typically regulating the dissemination and not the 
collection of data.98
 In Europe,99 the 1995 data directive suggested a mixed approach to protecting health data, 
providing that “personal data must be ! collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”,100 
and also prohibiting the “processing of data concerning health”.101 The member states, however, have 
done little to promote a true collection-centric regime or meaningfully to limit the disclosure of 
patient information within the health care environment. For example, the Data Protection Act 1998 
(UK)102 vests health information with the elevated protection classification of “sensitive personal 
data”,103 yet places few restrictions on data used in the context of the “provision of care and treatment 
and the management of health care services”.104
 In Australia,105 the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) extended the operation of 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to cover the private sector, including health care,106 and introduced the 
seminal National Privacy Principles.107 The 1988 Act had established the position of Federal Privacy 
Commissioner,108 and in 2001, the Commissioner issued Guidelines on Privacy in the Private Health 
Sector109 that apply National Privacy Principles in the health context. The Guidelines provide for a 
robust collection-centric approach as, in most cases, they require consent prior to collecting patient 
health information, require disclosure of the purposes for which the information is being collected, 
and limit the data collected to “what is necessary for the health service provider’s functions and 
activities”.110 The Guidelines distinguish between primary and secondary (such as commercial 
aggregation111) uses of patient data in terms of “the handling of information within an organisation” 
and “the transfer of information outside the organisation”.112 Crucially, the Guidelines state that a 
provider should “only use or disclose personal information for the primary purpose for which it was 
collected, or for directly related secondary purposes if these fall within the reasonable expectations of 
the individual”.113 Australian federal law has already been supplemented by State legislation, such as 
the Health Records Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW),114 applying specifically to medical records. 
 In the United States115 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (US) 
committed the Federal Government to a process of “administrative simplification” to reduce health 
care costs. That mandate included regulatory authority to promulgate national Standards for Privacy 
of Individually Identifiable Health Information116 (PIHI). These regulations place no limitations on 
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the collection of health data. It is a classic disclosure-centric system but, particularly after the Bush 
Administration removed any requirements of consent for data used for treatment purposes,117 one that 
promises more than it delivers. Although the regulations limit use and disclosure with a “minimum 
necessary” rule,118 that limitation is inapplicable in cases of treatment or when law requires the 
disclosure.119 Further, PIHI permits disclosure to a very broad range of public health, law 
enforcement and judicial authorities120 and less than robust consented-to disclosures for secondary 
uses.121  
 In summary, therefore, the European Union, at least in practice, has favoured a disclosure-centric 
approach. The United States has adopted a purely disclosure-centric approach to health privacy, albeit 
one backed by a comprehensive regulatory compliance model. In contrast, the Australian federal 
system mixes collection-centric and disclosure-centric principles. To a large extent the EHR systems 
that are emerging reflect the different approaches of these patient data regulatory systems. For 
example, HealthConnect is heavily collection-centric and provides for considerable patient autonomy 
as to what data may be pushed to the centralised record summary. In contrast, the United States 
system, at least if it continues down its path to full horizontal interoperability, seems to contemplate 
no limitations on collection and, if the PIHI model is adopted, is unlikely to restrict the circulation of 
data among systems provided the data are being used for treatment purposes. 
Litigation costs 
Electronic health record systems, even those that adequately protect patient data, inevitably will incur 
costs because of their broader interactions with the legal system. Thus, it is likely that plaintiffs will 
attempt to leverage the new systems to promote their recovery in clinical negligence cases. For 
example, it is arguable that, initially at least, plaintiffs will derive litigation benefits from a secure, 
unalterable record.122 A longitudinal record also will identify all provider-patient points of contact 
prior to an adverse event, thereby potentially increasing the pool of answerable defendants. Further, 
the availability of longitudinal patient data will inform the standard of care in clinical negligence 
cases, trapping health care providers who are late adopters of the technology. Similarly, aggressive 
plaintiffs’ attorneys will attempt to use data-mining tools to identify related occurrences to bolster 
evidence or validate class actions, or even use their clients’ rights of access and modification to 
manipulate the record.123
 Equally, emerging EHR and linked systems, such as those used for decision-support, will 
themselves likely contain design and other operational flaws that will expose health care providers to 
legal risk. Early adopters are likely to face liability risks because of system deficiencies124 or 
insufficient training, while those who wait for mature systems are likely to face actions for their 
failure to implement new but plaintiff-labelled “state-of-the-art” EHR systems.125
CONCLUSION 
In general terms, the United States has made considerable progress towards implementing 
technologies that streamline health care transactions (including highly detailed security 
specifications126) and some progress towards the adoption of CPOE/CDSS systems. For the United 
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States, therefore, the EHR is to some extent the “last piece of the puzzle” in creating a health 
information infrastructure. Australia, in very general terms, is in the opposite position, already testing 
aspects of its national EHR system but relatively undeveloped in its adoption of error-reducing or 
(and here because of far less need than in the United States) transactional technologies. The United 
Kingdom, apparently some way ahead of its European Union partners, recently embarked on an 
ambitious plan, seemingly on all fronts. Currently, the differences in progress that exist between these 
mature systems reveal less about the final nature of their EHR systems and more about process and 
their overall health care system models. In particular, and while hardly an original or nuanced 
observation, it is clear that the United Kingdom and Australian systems are centralised, “top-down” 
models, while changes in the United States tend to be more commercially-driven and “bottom-up”. 
 The future of EHR systems is as clouded as any in the e-health domain. Will electronic records 
conquer the technical problems they pose, avoid the security and privacy costs their critics identify, 
and deliver lower costs and higher quality? Or will they be responsible for still more costs and errors, 
while promoting the continued industrialisation of health care delivery and subordinating patient 
autonomy and professional ideals to soulless systems? In addition to the technical challenges they 
pose to their architects, EHRs bring with them a complex array of challenges for health lawyers – 
challenges that must be addressed before these systems become fully operational. It has never been 
more important for health lawyers to be conversant with an emerging technology and to fully engage 
in its developmental processes so as to positively influence the EHRs’ potential to improve care while 
preserving patient autonomy. 
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